Sunday, May 27, 2007

I. William Zartman & the Final Solution of the Sahrawi Problem

On 16 May 2007, the Washington-based Center for Strategic & International Studies presented an article in its Africa Policy Forum series titled "Western Sahara – Continuing Standoff." The author of the article, Anna Theofilopoulou, is described as follows:

Anna Theofilopoulou covered Western Sahara and North Africa in the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations from 1994 to 2006. She worked closely with former U.S. Secretary of State, James A. Baker, III throughout his appointment as Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General on Western Sahara – from March 1997 until his resignation in June 2004.

Ms. Theofilopoulou clearly has an intimate familiarity with the Western Sahara issue, and her analysis of the present situation is one of the better ones that I have read in a while. The whole article is well worth reading, but for the purposes of this post I quote her concluding paragraph:

The Security Council has chosen to deal with this issue by adopting the suggestion by the Secretary-General for negotiations between the parties without preconditions. This is not the first time that the Security Council, when confronted with a difficult choice and crucial disagreements among its members, has bounced the issue back into the court of the Secretary-General. There has been giddy talk among Morocco’s supporters about a “breakthrough,” since the parties have indeed agreed to direct talks. However, given the irreconcilable nature of the positions that each side has brought to the table, what are the chances for these talks to bring about any results? At best, the latest decision by the Security Council promises several more years of stalemate.

I agree with this assessment and can only add that, at worst, war in some form could return to the Maghreb. The Africa Policy Forum actively solicits comments and what really caught my eye was this comment by I. William Zartman directly following the article:

· 1. I William Zartman | May 16th, 2007 at 10:19 pm

Ana [sic] Theofilopoulou’s piece on the Western Sahar [sic] is cogent and well informed, but it stops where it should continue. Sure, Algeria needs to be brought into a settlement. But what settlement? Morocco’s proposal for autonomy is the only proposal ever made by one of the parties including Algeria) that departs from extreme positions and seeks the middle. In so doing, Morcco [sic] takes enormous risks: 1) that its autonomy proposal be viewed as a step toward independence, like East Timor or Palestine, as the UN Secretariat tends to view the solution, and 2) that its proposal be viewed as the new starting position and Algeria then proposing to split the difference, landing on te [sic] Polisario side of the “crest of sovereignty.” The challenge is to flesh out and implement the autonomy plan as a final solution, and inthat [sic] the US, France and Spain are not wrong in supporting the plan. Theofilopoulou does not tell us what to support, only that Algeria (and the PLS) need to be brought in. Into what? Autonomy is a good proposal and we should stick to it.

While fully aware of Mr. Zartman’s lofty reputation as Professor of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution and Director of the Conflict Management Program at Johns Hopkins University, I am somewhat baffled and disturbed by some of his comments regarding Ms. Theofilopoulou’s article and on the Western Saharan conflict in general.

His basic problem with the article is that it does not take a stand, that “it stops where it should continue.” What he means by this becomes immediately clear. He writes, “Morocco’s proposal for autonomy is the only proposal ever made by one of the parties (including Algeria) that departs from extreme positions and seeks the middle.” I find Mr. Zartman’s idea that the autonomy plan “seeks the middle” totally off base. The Polisario Front and Morocco signed a UN-brokered agreement in 1991 calling for a referendum on independence. Given that the UN had been calling for this referendum since the 1960s when the Western Sahara was designated a non-self-governing territory and given that both parties agreed to the referendum, I am at a loss to understand how this proposal to hold a referendum could be considered an “extreme position.”

In fact, for the decade after 1991 the holding of a referendum on independence WAS the “middle,” and both parties considered autonomy “extreme.” A quote by John Bolton, who helped James Baker in the negotiations, is illustrative:

…when Secretary Baker went to the region and asked the King, asked the government of Morocco, asked the leadership of the POLISARIO, "What do you want?" They said, without hesitation and without equivocation, "We want a free and fair referendum." "Want to talk about autonomy?" "No, we don't want to talk about autonomy. We want to talk about a referendum. (Defense Forum Foundation, 1998 Congressional Defense and Foreign Policy Forum, “Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict”)

Mr. Zartman’s view that autonomy is now a commendable middle position that should be supported by all totally ignores the history of how and why Morocco finally rejected the referendum on independence that after all both parties had agreed to. In several stages, Morocco quite simply came to the realization that it would or could lose any referendum, no matter how many concessions were made by the Polisario (and they made several) and no matter how many thousands of pro-Moroccan settlers were added to the voter list. In fact, the Polisario’s acceptance of James Baker’s last plan in 2003 (Baker II) was an incredibly risky concession in that the Moroccan settlers that would be allowed to vote in Baker’s referendum greatly outnumbered the indigenous Sahrawi. And even with the numbers heavily stacked in its favor, Rabat, apparently still convinced it could lose, rejected Baker II, took any possibility of independence off the table, and declared autonomy a noble compromise.

Mr. Zartman makes much of Morocco’s risks in proposing autonomy. For instance he states, “Morcco [sic] takes enormous risks: 1) that its autonomy proposal be viewed as a step toward independence, like East Timor or Palestine, as the UN Secretariat tends to view the solution.” Mr. Zartman is quite right that the UN Secretariat groups the Western Sahara with East Timor and Palestine as places that under clear international law are (and in the case of East Timor were) entitled to independence. What Mr. Zartman doesn’t make clear is why the Western Sahara should be treated differently from the other two, and in particular East Timor. East Timor before independence fell precisely under the same legal framework as the Western Sahara. Both were categorized as non-self-governing territories with the right to self-determination with independence as an option. I would be interested in knowing why Mr. Zartman apparently accepts East Timor’s independence but rejects the possibility of the Western Sahara’s. In any event, his flippant dismissal of international law (“as the UN Secretariat tends to view the solution”) in favor of Morocco’s autonomy plan is disturbing. And in the final analysis what Mr. Zartman is saying is that Morocco's "enormous" risk is that in the end international law just might prevail. How horrible.

In addition, on the question of risk, Mr. Zartman is silent on the risks of the Western Saharans accepting autonomy. Morocco pretty much broke every agreement it made with the Polisario in the decade after 1991. Why should the Polisario trust that Rabat would honor any autonomy agreement, even with constitutional and international guarantees?

I would urge Mr. Zartman to consider the cautionary tale of Eritrea. Eritrea in 1952 (in a situation with far too many eerie parallels to the Western Sahara to go into here) was forced into an autonomy arrangement within Ethiopia – but with seemingly ironclad assurances that Eritrea’s status could not be changed without UN approval. It took little more than a decade for Ethiopia to throw autonomy out the window and fully annex Eritrea, with hardly a whimper from the UN or the world community. And then it took another thirty plus years of unbelievable carnage and misery in the horn of Africa before Eritrean independence was achieved.

Agreeing to autonomy for the Polisario involves, it seems to me, an incredible leap of faith, and if oil one day is discovered in Western Saharan waters does anyone really think that Morocco would continue to allow the Western Saharans to run their own affairs?

Mr. Zartman quickly reaches his conclusion:

The challenge is to flesh out and implement the autonomy plan as a final solution, and inthat [sic] the US, France and Spain are not wrong in supporting the plan. Theofilopoulou does not tell us what to support, only that Algeria (and the PLS) need to be brought in. Into what? Autonomy is a good proposal and we should stick to it.

My impression (and I think Ms. Theofilopoulou’s too) is that no amount of fleshing out will be enough to convince the Polisario to discard their right to self-determination and accept the extreme solution of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. They have international law on their side, and as mentioned above they have every reason to completely mistrust Morocco’s intentions. I don’t think it is farfetched to consider that if the Western Sahara loses its international status as a non-self-governing territory and becomes an “internal affair,” Morocco would have free rein to really bring us a “final solution,” as Mr. Zartman so delicately puts it. And if you feel I am being a bit alarmist here, I suggest you check out the latest Western Sahara reports from Freedom House, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch to get a picture of Morocco’s brutal totalitarian occupation.

I find it interesting that Mr. Zartman would have us “implement” Morocco’s autonomy plan, without any consideration of what the Western Saharans might think about it nor any mention that the Polisario has already categorically rejected the plan. This seems to be a plan to ram autonomy down the Western Saharans’ throats.

He feels that “the US, France and Spain are not wrong in supporting the plan.” I guess there IS nothing wrong with supporting it, but there is everything wrong with imposing it; and imposing it seems to be very much what Mr. Zartman has in mind. What else could he have in mind given that the Polisario has, I repeat, already rejected Morocco’s plan? Mr. Zartman has no problem with bringing Algeria and the Polisario into the process, but only to discuss autonomy. That smells of imposition to me.

And finally Mr. Zartman finishes with, “Autonomy is a good proposal and we should stick to it.” Good for whom, Mr. Zartman? And your argument that we should “stick to it” appears to be more of an argument to “stick it to” these poor desert people who deserve better.

What I find most disturbing about Mr. Zartman’s statement of support for Morocco’s autonomy plan is that he is a world-famous and prestigious expert on conflict resolution. No matter how nice autonomy might appear on paper, forced autonomy or autonomy outside the context of the Western Sahara’s right to self-determination (with independence as an option) is a recipe for disaster and conflict deterioration.

Mr. Zartman gets on Ms Theofilopoulou’s case about her not telling us what to support, so I will give my view. I can say wholeheartedly that I support a return to the referendum on independence as the basis for a settlement. The UN proposal to hold the referendum has been the only substantive thing the two parties have agreed on in over thirty years. Just because Morocco backed out of the referendum when it realized it might lose is no reason to scuttle this middle ground. The great powers must finally pressure Morocco to honor its agreements and abide by international law. The autonomy plan, that rewards Morocco’s aggression, sidesteps international law, and has little or no discernable support from the Polisario or among the Western Saharans, should be buried very deep in the sands of the Sahara.

Tuesday, May 08, 2007

Marc S. Ellenbogen & the Myopic Miasma of Moroccan Malice

In a recent UPI/Washington Times article titled Atlantic Eye: Morocco's Right to Sahara, Marc S. Ellenbogen reports on his recent visit to Morocco, heading a delegation from the Global Panel Foundation and the Prague Society for International Cooperation. The purpose of the trip was to hold “a series of briefings and brain-storming sessions … held under the auspices of THE ROYAL STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE (IRES)” on the future of Morocco. The visit was “at the invitation of the Hon. Hassan Abouyoub, Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to H.M. King Mohammed.” The article, which deals specifically with the Western Sahara situation, opens with the following poetic paragraph:

Washington D.C., April 26 (UPI) -- Ambassador Hassan Abouyoub, Jens-Hald Madsen and I stood on the portico of the magnificent Mirage Hotel in Marabata. The Atlantic waves hammered the steep cove below. Hassan and I took a smokers break, as Madsen noted the vast beauty in front of us.

From what follows in the article, one has to wonder what it was they were smoking while gazing down from the portico. Morocco is, after all, the world’s leading exporter of hashish. In any event, as the article moves from this idyllic scene to more serious matters of international law regarding the Western Sahara, Mr. Ellenbogen’s grasp of reality seems to completely deteriorate as he descends into a myopic miasma of Moroccan malice (hey, I get to wax poetic too).

Having reported recently on several cases of media madness on the Western Sahara, I’ll try to keep it brief by touching on the worst of what Mr. Ellenbogen has to say. I urge you, however, to follow the link and read the whole article because you will be tickled by the gravitas of it all. Here are some of the gems:

“It remains undisputed that Spain's restoration of Western Sahara to Morocco was legal.” Of course it is exactly the opposite of this that is much closer to being “undisputed.” The UN has ruled unambiguously that Spain’s transfer of the Western Sahara to Morocco (and Mauritania) was ILLEGAL under international law. And Morocco’s claim that it was a “restoration” was emphatically rejected. Here, Mr. Ellenbogen, are the links to the International Court of Justice ruling on the Western Sahara in 1975 and the more recent reaffirmation of that ruling by the UN’s legal counsel, Hans Corell, in 2002.

“The Moroccan proposal for extended autonomy submitted to the UN has been praised by experts - but rejected by both the Polisario and Algeria.” Sure SOME experts on the Western Sahara have supported Morocco’s proposal, but most of the experts that I am aware of are dismissive of any such Moroccan plan that denies the Western Saharans the right to self-determination.

“The supporters of the Sahrawi, who are mostly Algerians and European 60's throw-backs, have used the question of human rights as an instrument for forcing the issue of Moroccan Western Saharan secession and independence.” Mr. Ellenbogen is apparently unaware that some 40 countries also support the Sahrawi. I’m trying to figure out who exactly these “European 60’s throw-backs” are. I suspect they are those Europeans who believe fervently in decolonization and self-determination for colonial peoples. But then Mr. Ellenbogen doesn’t appear to support self-determination. As for those Sahrawi supporters using “the question of human rights as an instrument for forcing the issue…,” what’s wrong with that? But then again the author doesn't seem to like human rights either.

“There is no legal reason for Morocco to accept the secession of Moroccan Western Sahara - and UN formal resolutions do not demand this either.” To illustrate the inanity of this statement, I’d like to tell the story of a friend of mine who left her husband and filed for divorce; a couple days later her lawyer got back to her with the good news that, since she had lied about her age (15) when they got married in Vegas, they had never legally been married – so they didn’t need to get divorced. Just as you can’t legally divorce if you were never legally married, you can’t legally secede if you were never legally joined in the first place. That precisely is the case with the Western Sahara since not one country recognizes Morocco’s annexation.

Morocco's approach, which respects the letter of the UN resolutions, puts an end to the logic for Moroccan Western Sahara secession.” How “Morocco’s approach…respects the letter of the UN resolutions” is a total mystery to me. Morocco’s autonomy proposal is an attempt to circumvent over thirty years of UN resolutions supporting Western Saharan self-determination. Sure the UN has urged the parties to start talking again, but nowhere does the UN support Morocco’s autonomy approach, which is clearly inconsistent with self-determination. Many UN resolutions, however, support the right of the Western Saharans to self-determination and independence if they so choose. And again to talk about putting an end to the logic for secession is absurd, since the parties were never married to begin with.

“The consensus at this Global Panel session is that the Moroccan Western Saharan question is best left to the principals involved. The United Nations, noted a ranking European diplomat, would best serve the needs of all concerned by removing itself from the entire question.” The Global Panel doesn’t seem to have a clue here that the Western Saharan question from 1975 until the late 80’s WAS “left to the principals involved” with minimal UN involvement. And it is not a coincidence that those were the years of war between the parties. It is disturbing that the best the panel can come up with is the return to a situation which would probably make war inevitable.

What is most interesting about this article is that Mr. Ellenbogen actually tries to make a legal case for Morocco’s autonomy plan. This is in stark contrast to the more-typical negative approach we have been seeing a lot of recently which says that one must support Moroccan sovereignty because the Polisario is a terrorist organization, or in cahoots with al-Qaeda, or communist, or in bed with Castro, or non-democratic, or whatever.

While Mr. Ellenbogen’s avoidance of the usual false negatives is I guess commendable, unfortunately his legal approach is just as bad. As I discuss above, his arguments that Spain’s transfer of the Western Sahara to Morocco was legal, that the Western Sahara quest for independence is illegal secession, that replacing self-determination with autonomy is legal, all these arguments are bogus. The UN and international law just don’t back him up on any of these things.

In the final analysis, this whole exercise by Mr. Ellenbogen strikes me as a thinly veiled attempt to kiss up to his gracious and generous Moroccan hosts by parroting their totally discredited legal opinions on the Western Sahara.